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ABSTRACT
In January 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon decided U.S. v. Ahrndt, the first case regarding the
reasonable expectation of privacy in a home wireless internet
network. The court found that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his unsecured home
wireless network because he had openly shared information
on a system freely accessible by his neighbors. This Article
examines the Ahrndt case and the potential legal effect this
issue may have on an individual’s expectation of privacy in
his or her wireless network and personal computer files. This
Article concludes that although the exact effects of new
technologies on search and seizure law have not been fully
explored by the courts, people should not expect the courts to
consider unencrypted wireless networks to be private.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant John Henry Ahrndt, on trial for transportation and
possession of child pornography, challenged the admissibility of key
evidence based on the fact that the materials were discovered on his
computer through his home wireless network by a police officer
without a warrant. 1 In the first case of its kind, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oregon found that Ahrndt could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in files he shared openly on an
unsecured wireless network, preventing his claim that the officer
violated the Fourth Amendment. 2
This Article discusses the extent of protections against searches
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, discusses the new issues
raised by the Ahrndt case, and explores possible future cases that
may present similar issues. This Article also analyzes cases arising
out of related new technologies to determine their potential influence
on the law of search and seizure and the legality of searching
computer networks.

1

United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *1 (D. Or. Jan.
28, 2010).
2
Id. at *9.
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK: AN EMPHASIS ON
REASONABLENESS
The Fourth Amendment provides citizens with the right to be
secure from unreasonable government searches and seizures of their
persons, houses, papers and effects. 3 The Amendment provides no
protection against searches performed by private citizens, 4 and it has
been established that invasions of a defendant’s privacy by
governmental agents subsequent to invasions by a private party are
tested by the degree to which they exceed the scope of the private
search. 5
The United States Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United
States introduced a two-part test for determining whether a courtissued warrant is required for a search or seizure. 6 First, a person
must subjectively expect privacy in the thing searched, and second,
society must recognize this expectation as reasonable. 7 The cases
discussed in this Article, in general, turn on the second prong of this
test: whether the expectation of privacy is one society accepts as
reasonable.
In applying this standard to specific situations, the Supreme Court
has taken a case-by-case approach. However, some trends emerge
from an analysis of the relevant cases. 8 For example, the Court has
recognized that developments in technology have served to decrease
reasonable expectations of privacy. 9
In Rakas v. United States, the Court articulated a standard that is
often applied by lower courts to evaluate whether a reasonable

3

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
5
Id. at 115.
6
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (finding that investigators
violated a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy when they listened to a
conversation inside a telephone booth using a wiretap).
7
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8
THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 64-65 (Carolina Academic Press 2008).
9
Id. at 65. See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“[i]n an
age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine,” there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy from 1,000 feet in the air).
4
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expectation of privacy exists in a given situation. 10 In that case, the
Court stated that “legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society.” 11 Ninth Circuit precedent
provides further guidance by establishing factors to help courts
determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. These
include the defendant’s possessory interest in the thing searched, 12
the measures the defendant took to protect it,13 whether it was labeled
as private, 14 and the presence or absence of a right to exclude
others. 15 With this framework in mind, the remainder of this Article
discusses the novel issue of whether Fourth Amendment protections
extend to an unsecured wireless network.
II. DISTRICT COURT FINDS NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN UNSECURED WIRELESS NETWORKS
John Henry Ahrndt was convicted of transportation and
possession of child pornography in violation of federal law based on
evidence found on his computer through his wireless network. 16 In
February 2007, an Oregon resident identified as JH was using her
personal computer when it automatically picked up a nearby wireless
network, to which she connected. 17 JH began using Apple’s iTunes
software, which allows users to share media files such as digital
photos and music over computer networks, and noticed that another
user’s files were available to her over the wireless network. 18 After
reading the names of some of these files, JH realized that they
contained child pornography and contacted the Washington County

10

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id. at 143 n.12.
12
United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2004).
16
He was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252-2253 (2006).
17
U.S. v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 28,
2010).
18
Id.
11
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Sheriff’s Office. 19 Further police investigation, including using the
computer belonging to JH to connect to the wireless network, using
her computer’s iTunes software to access the files in question, and
opening one of the files, revealed that the files indeed contained child
pornography and that the network and the files were those of the
defendant. 20
At trial, Ahrndt filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained
through his wireless network, arguing that it was the product of a
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.21 The district court
found that Ahrndt did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy, and that even if he had, such an expectation was
unreasonable because he had left his wireless network unencrypted
and his iTunes settings openly shared his files with that network. 22
In support of his Fourth Amendment argument, Ahrndt also
claimed that the files had been part of an electronic communication
protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),
which he said provided evidence that his expectation of privacy in
those files was reasonable. 23 The ECPA is an amendment to Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the
Federal Wiretap Act). It protects against the interception of electronic
communications, including those stored on a computer, and
establishes the legal standards the government must satisfy to obtain
stored or real-time electronic communications. 24 The court found,
however, that the access was expressly authorized under ECPA
because the evidence was obtained “through an electronic
communication system that is configured so that such electronic
communication is readily accessible to the general public.” 25

19

Id.
Id. at *2.
21
Id.
22
Id. at *5.
23
Id. at *7.
24
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). See also Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8.
25
Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006)).
20
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY IN SECURED AND UNSECURED
WIRELESS NETWORKS
As wireless networking technology becomes increasingly
ubiquitous, cases similar to Ahrndt will likely arise. Variations on the
facts of this case may lead to more difficult constitutional questions.
As the Supreme Court stated in City of Ontario v. Quon, a case in
which a municipal employer searched the contents of an employee’s
city-issued pagers, “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear.” 26 Emerging technologies
such as wireless networks, data encryption, and file-sharing networks
are likely to raise issues in regard to their potential effects on the
legality of searches.
A. Expectation of Privacy in Wireless Communications
Courts have held that people have lower expectations of privacy
in wireless communications because of the ease with which
information can be intercepted. Yet legislation may provide
protection where the Constitution does not. The seminal case on this
issue is the 1973 decision in United States v. Hall, in which
defendant-appellant Hall was convicted after using radio telephones
that had been installed in his car to call landline phones to distribute
marijuana. 27 Hall argued that evidence obtained by intercepting the
radio calls was the fruit of an illegal search. 28 The court stated that
conversations intercepted in this manner theoretically should not be
afforded more protection than one between two radio transceivers.
But the Ninth Circuit explained that it was constrained by the
language of the Federal Wiretap Act to find that Hall’s
communication was protected by that statute, which defined “wire
communication” as any transfer “made in whole or in part through”
wire, cable, or other like connection, where one end of the phone call
was made on a landline. 29
26

City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir. 1973).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 196-97. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
27
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The Hall court’s reasoning prevailed in the later decision Tyler v.
Berodt. 30 In that case, the Berodt family listened to conversations the
Tylers made using a cordless phone connected to their landline
service. After overhearing conversations that led them to suspect
criminal activity, the Berodts alerted the police. 31 In the ensuing civil
suit against the Berodts and law enforcement officers, the court was
unconstrained by the Federal Wiretap Act because the 1986
amendment by the ECPA changed the definition of “wire
communication” to exclude the radio portion of a phone call carried
in part over a wire. 32 The Berodt court held that because there was no
reason for the Tylers to expect privacy in conversations using such a
device, those conversations were not protected by the Fourth
Amendment. 33 Other courts have found that the wireless portions of
phone calls also transmitted in part over landlines are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. 34 In 1994, however, the Federal Wiretap
Act was amended again to protect wireless communications. 35
The Hall and Berodt cases illustrate that courts generally find that
wireless communications, especially those using radio frequency
technology, do not give rise to an expectation of privacy. This is
based on the fact that radio frequency communications are easily
intercepted, and a belief that people are generally aware (or should be
aware) of this fact.
B. Password Protection
While courts afford less Fourth Amendment protection to wireless
communications, they have determined that people do have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal computer files,
30

Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 705-06.
32
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 101(a), 100 Stat. 1848 (“such term [wire communications] does not include the
radio portion of a cordless telephone [call] that is transmitted between the cordless
telephone handset and the base unit”).
33
Berodt, 877 F.2d at 706-07.
34
See, e.g., United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1247 (7th Cir. 1970);
Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F.Supp. 584, 589 (M.D. La. 1986); State v. DeLaurier,
488 A.2d 688, 694 (R.I. 1985).
35
See, e.g., McKamey v. Roach, 55 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1995).
31
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especially where the files are password protected. In U.S. v.
Heckenkemp, the Ninth Circuit held that a student had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his computer’s files despite having used the
computer to hack into the university’s e-mail system. 36 In an appeal
from his conviction for intentionally accessing a protected computer
without authorization based in part on evidence collected from his
computer, the court stated that “he also had a legitimate, objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal computer,” and that
“the mere act of accessing a network does not in itself extinguish
privacy expectations, nor does the fact that others may have
occasional access to the computer.” 37 The court found the search
justified on other grounds. 38
A person may lose any expectation of privacy achieved by using a
password by sharing it with others. In U.S. v. D’Andrea, the
defendant and her boyfriend had allegedly sexually abused the
defendant’s eight-year-old daughter and posted pictures of the abuse
to a password-protected website. 39 An anonymous caller to the
Department of Social Services reported the activity and provided the
password. 40 At trial, D’Andrea challenged the introduction of the
photos based on her expectation of privacy in them. 41 The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the
password protection did convey an expectation of privacy, but
because she had shared the password to the site with another person,
she had assumed the risk that it would be exposed. 42
The absence of password protection has also been cited as a
reason to find that there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy
in digital files. For example, in Casella v. Borders, a woman lent her
phone to her boyfriend, who was subsequently arrested. 43 A police
officer discovered sexual photos of the couple on the phone and
disclosed them publicly. 44 In the resulting suit for emotional distress
36

United States v. Heckenkemp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1146-47.
38
Id. at 1147.
39
United States v. D'Andrea, 497 F.Supp.2d 117, 118 (D. Mass. 2007).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 119.
42
Id. at 123.
43
Casella v. Borders, 649 F.Supp.2d 435, 437 (W.D. Va. 2009).
44
Id. at 473.
37
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and Fourth Amendment violations, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia dismissed her claims because she
had taken no measures to protect the images, specifically citing the
absence of password protection on the phone. 45
C. Distinguishing Ahrndt
Even with the Ahrndt decision as precedent, a defendant may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in computer files that he or
she did not intend to be shared on even an unencrypted network. In
Ahrndt, JH would not have stumbled across Ahrndt’s files had he not
openly shared them on that network through his iTunes software. 46
The holding in this case was thus only that Ahrndt had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in files shared on an unsecured wireless
network. 47 In the words of the court, “in order to hold that defendant
had no right to privacy, it is also necessary to find that society would
not recognize as reasonable an expectation of privacy in the contents
of a shared iTunes library available for streaming on an unsecured
wireless network.” This is a factual distinction that may make a
difference in future cases.
D. Restrictions on Unauthorized Network Access
One additional point on the nature of wireless networking could
be a potential factor in future cases: state and federal laws prohibit
accessing a computer network without authorization. For example,
Oregon makes accessing a computer without authorization a Class A
misdemeanor, and Washington makes accessing a computer system
without authorization a gross misdemeanor. 48 The federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act also criminalizes the unauthorized access of
45

Id. at 439.
See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-KI, 2010 WL 373994, at *5 (D. Or.
Jan. 28, 2010) (explaining that the default setting in the iTunes software in question
was not to share files on the network, indicating that he took affirmative action to
make the files public).
47
Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *5-7.
48
OR. REV. STAT. § 164.377 (2009) (making “Computer Crime” a Class A
misdemeanor); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.120 (2010) (making “Computer
Trespass in the Second Degree” a gross misdemeanor).
46
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computer networks in some circumstances. 49 If these statutes reflect
societal expectations about privacy, the illegal nature of these actions
arguably suggest that society is prepared to afford even unsecured
wireless networks a reasonable expectation of privacy. Ahrndt did not
argue and the court did not consider this point, perhaps because,
though illegal, the practice of accessing open wireless networks is
common and possibly even accepted. 50
E. Reduced Privacy Expectations in File-Sharing Networks
As courts have reduced the reasonable expectation of privacy in
wireless communications, they have also reduced such expectations
in the context of file-sharing networks. In two Ninth Circuit cases on
the issue, the court held that a police officer who accessed child
pornography on a defendant’s computer through the LimeWire filesharing network was not burdened by the prohibitions of the Fourth
Amendment. 51 In U.S. v. Ganoe, the court held that the defendant
“knew or should have known that the software might allow others to
access his computer,” 52 and that “[m]oreover, he was explicitly
warned before completing the installation that the folder into which
files are downloaded would be shared with other users in the peer-topeer network.” 53
The defendant in U.S. v. Borowy, a case with very similar facts,
attempted to distinguish Ganoe by arguing that the defendant had
specifically downloaded a version of the software with an option
(which he attempted to engage) that could block others from
accessing his files. 54 The court held he had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his files available to LimeWire because he had
downloaded and used software that he knew would allow others to
49

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
See Randy Cohen, The Ethicist: Wi-Fi Fairness, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2004),
http://wwnytimes.com/2004/02/08/magazine/08ETHICIST.html (arguing that it is
ethical to “use but not overuse Wi-Fi hot spots you encounter”).
51
See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct 2037 (2009); United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th
Cir. 2010).
52
See Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1117.
53
See Ganoe, 538 F.3d at 1127.
54
Borowy, 595 F.3d at 1047.
50
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view his files and had failed to take the steps necessary to prevent
others from doing so. 55
This recent case law illustrates that with both wireless and filesharing networks, users often set up hardware and software with
default settings, typically leaving the networks open to the public
despite warnings that there are steps that can be taken to protect the
data. This practice appears to reduce the amount of privacy that users
can expect in these networks.
CONCLUSION
The Ahrndt case is the first to deal with expectations of privacy in
wireless networks, but it likely represents the first case of many to
raise these sorts of constitutional questions. New technologies
generally decrease the amount of privacy people have in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, and the courts have begun to
outline some of the contours of this area of the law. Wireless
communications generally cannot be expected to be private.
Encrypted or password-protected digital files, however, can generally
be expected to be private. Finally, where a person exposes his or her
computer or files to the world, as most file-sharing network users
(and many wireless-network users) do, he or she loses any
expectation of privacy in the files. The Ahrndt decision is consistent
with prior law and signals a sensible rule going forward.

55

Id. at 1048.
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